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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
CONTRACTS
Earnest-Money Payments-Vendees Recovery Denied Where
Agreement Fails to Comply with Statute of Frauds. In Schweiter v.
Halsey,' the Washington Supreme Court held that if a vendor of real
property has not repudiated, but is ready, willing and able to perform,
the vendee cannot recover payments made upon the purchase price
although the earnest-money agreement does not satisfy the Statute of
Frauds.
In October, 1956 the vendor and vendee had executed an earnest-
money receipt. This receipt, the court held, failed to comply with
the Statute of Frauds because it did not contain an adequate legal
description of the land at the time that it was executed.2 In January,
1957 the vendor executed a deed and requested the vendees to execute
a note and mortgage with an insurance company to provide the neces-
sary financing. The vendee refused to sign the papers and gave notice
of recission. The vendor promptly tendered performance, which was
refused by the vendee.
The vendee instituted an action seeking a declaration of its rights
and duties under the receipt. The vendor, having sold the land to a
third party for seven-thousand dollars less than the vendee had agreed
to pay, answered with a counter-claim, seeking recovery of the seven-
thousand dollars plus special damages. The trial court permitted the
vendee to recover his earnest-money payment and dismissed the ven-
dor's counter-claim. The vendor appealed.
The supreme court, stating that an action at law presupposes a valid
binding contract,' affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the counter-
claim. It refused to allow recovery of the earnest-money payment,
however, since the vendor had not repudiated the agreement and had
tendered performance to the defaulting vendee.
In refusing to allow recovery of the earnest-money payments, al-
though the agreement would not have been enforceable against the
157 Wn.2d 707, 359 P.2d 821 (1961).
2 Only oral authority was given the broker to subsequently attach the legal descrip-
tion. The vendors could not only have kept the earnest-money payments, but also had
a valid cause of action for specific performance of the contract, or in the alternative,
an action for damages, had they authorized their broker to attach the legal description
at a later date by noting such on the receipt at the time of execution. Edwards v.
Meader, 34 Wn.2d 921, 210 P.2d 1019 (1949).
Such an authorization to attach the legal description can not be implied from the
fact of the real estate brokers' possession of the earnest-money-agreement signed by
both parties. Barth v. Barth, 19 Wn.2d 543, 143 P.2d 542 (1943).
3 57 Wn.2d 707, 714, 359 P.2d 821, 825 (1961). Accord, Hedges v. Hurd, 47 Wn2d
683, 289 P.2d 706 (1955).
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defaulting vendee at law or in equity, the court followed prior Wash-
ington case law' and the weight of authority.' The court's result is
achieved in many jurisdictions on the theory that an agreement in
violation of the Statute of Frauds is unenforceable rather than void.'
The elements essential to the existence of a contract are found to exist,
including the consideration necessary to justify the vendor's retention
of earnest-money payments.7 Failure to comply with the statute results
only in loss of the right to enforce the contract directly.'
In judisdictions where recovery of earnest-money payments by a
buyer in default is allowed, the Statute of Frauds is usually interpreted
to void contracts which do not comply with it.' No contract exists and
no legal relations result from the purported contract. The lack of
consideration results in the defaulting buyer's right to a return of the
earnest-money in an action for restitution.10 In some jurisdictions
where recovery is allowed, the Statute of Frauds is not interpreted to
void non-complying contracts. Rather, restitution is granted on the
belief that the statute must prevent indirect as well as direct enforce-
ment of contracts which do not comply with its requirements."
The Washington Statute of Frauds' 2 has been interpreted as voiding
4 Dubke v. Kassa, 29 Wn2d 486, 187 P2d 611 (1947) ; Johnson v. Puget Mill Co., 28
Wash. 515, 68 Pac. 867 (1902) (dicta). But see Hooper v. First Exchange Nat. Bank
of Coeur D'Alene, 53 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1931). The court allowed recovery of money
paid on void agreement by a purchaser who had defaulted on mortgage payments. The
court disposed of the defenses of estoppel and laches and stated at page 597: "It seems
quite unwarranted to say that in such circumstances there was such conduct... as to
preclude him from relief to which he otherwise would be entitled."
5 49 AM. Jul. Statute of Frauds § 564 (1943) ; RESTATE ENT, CONTRACTS § 355
(1932). The Restatement of Contracts gives no right of restitution unless such a right
would exist if the requirement of the statute were satisfied and the contract an enfor-
ceable one.
049 AM. JuR. Statute of Frauds § 564 (1943) ; 2 CoRaix, CoNTRAcTs § 279 (1950);
RESTATE mENT, CONTRACTS § 344, comment on subsection (4) (1932).
7 2 CoRmIN, CONTRACrs § 286 P.945 (1950) : "An oral promise is a sufficient consid-
eration for a return promise, even though the oral promise is within the statute of
frauds and not directly enforceable.... Such an oral promise is not void."
8 49 Am. Jun. Statute of Frauds § 564 (1943) ; 169 A.L.R. 192 (1947) ; RESTATE-
mENT, CoNTRAcTS § 355 (1932).
0 49 AM. Jul. Statute of Frauds § 564 (1943).
'0 Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418, 12 Am. Rep. 311 (1873) ; Reedy v. Ebsen, 60 S.D. 1,
242 N.W. 592 (1932).
11 See, e.g., Garbarino v. Union Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 Colo. 149, 109 P.2d 638(1941). 49 Ams. Ju. Statute of Frauds § 564 (1943). Colorado, Minnesota. New York,
Oklahoma, and Oregon have refused recovery when the applicable Statute of Frauds
provided that agreements in violation were void or not to be valid, rather than merely
unenforcible. 169 A.L.R. 191 (1947).
12 Wash. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 33, § 1. "[E]very conveyance of real estate, or any
interest therein, and every contract creating or evidencing any encumbrance upon real
estate, shall be by deed: . . !' But see Comment, The English Statute of Frauds in
Washington, 34 WAsHrNGTON L. Rv. 124, 133 (1959).
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contracts which do not comply with its requirements.13 Thus the
Washington court has adopted an underlying rationale which, in most
jurisdictions that have adopted it, allows the defaulting vendee to
recover his down payment if the statute is not complied with. 4 While
the court in Schweiter v. Halsey followed the weight of authority in
terms of result, it neglected to make clear the reasoning by which it
reached its conclusion.
The court had considered whether a defaulting vendee can recover
earnest-money payments under an agreement failing to comply with
the Statute of Frauds on two previous occasions. In Stanek v. Peterson5
the vendor had conceded the vendee's right to "ask for and receive
the return of the initial payment." 6 In view of the conceded point
the court readily allowed the vendee to recover without a review of
the question. Dubke v. Kassa"' presented facts nearly identical with
those in Sckweiter v. Halsey: The vendee had refused to purchase
property after executing a defective earnest-money agreement and
paying the vendor two-hundred and fifty dollars. Accepting the ven-
dor's argument 8 that Stanek was not controlling, the court did not
allow the vendee to recover. In support of its decision the court cited
sources which say that an agreement not complying with the Statute
of Frauds is unenforceable rather than void."9
In finding that the agreement in the Schweiter case was void, yet
making its decision turn on the vendee's repudiation and the vendor's
willingness to perform, the court has committed itself to a logical
inconsistency. If the agreement was void, it gave rise to no legal
relations.20 There was no legal excuse for refusing to return the
vendee's earnest-money; no consideration had been given for holding
it." If the vendee's repudiation was significant, it was because he owed
a legal duty to the seller. In attaching significance to the vendee's
repudiation the court impliedly recognized a legal duty, created by a
13 Martin v. Seigel, 35 Wn2d 223, 212 P.2d 107 (1949) ; Leo v. Casselman, 29 Wn.2d
47, 185 P.2d 107 (1947); Fosburgh v. Sando, 24 Wn2d 586, 166 P2d 850 (1946);
Martinson v. Cruikshank, 3 Wn2d 565, 101 P.2d 604 (1940).
14 See authorities cited note 8 supra.
15 26 Wn2d 385, 174 P2d 308 (1946).
16 Id. at 387, 174 P2d at 309.
17 29 Wn.2d 486, 187 P.2d 611 (1947).
18 Brief for Appellant, p. 15.
19Johnson v. Puget Mill Co., 28 Wash. 515, 68 Pac. 867 (1902) (dicta). 49 Am.
JUR. Statute of Frauds § 564 (1943). 37 CJ.S. Statute of Frauds § 256 (1943);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 355 (1932).
20 "A contract void under the statute of frauds is a mere nullity, and can not be used
for any purpose whatever." Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418, 12 Am. Rep. 311, 312 (1873).
21 "The parol contract being void, furnishes no consideration for the payment." Reedy
v. Ebsen, 60 S.D. 1, 242 N.W. 592, 594 (1932).
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confessedly void agreement. It enforced this duty indirectly by refus-
ing restitution.22
Chief Justice Finley, in dissent, recognizes this logical inconsistency
of the majority. He states in his opinion2" that if the purported contract
is void, recovery of the earnest-money should be granted. He justifiably
demands a clarification of the majority's reasoning in arriving at its
decision.
In stating the accepted rule against recovery of earnest-money by
a defaulting purchaser, the court cites24 the Restatement of Contracts"
as authority. In commenting on the cited subsection the Restatement
explains: "Contracts within the statute of frauds are neither illegal
nor void, even though the requirements for direct enforcement are not
complied with." (Emphasis added.) In holding the agreement between
Schweiter and Halsey void, the majority rejects the Restatement
rationale, yet adopts and cites the conclusion of that rationale in
denying recovery. The court also cited Johnson v. Puget Mill Co.2"
and Browne v. Anderson7 as authority for its decision. In Johnson
the agreement had been taken without the statute by part performance "
so that the question of a vendee's recovery under an agreement
violative of the statute was not presented. The rule against recovery
was stated as a dictum in Johnson, however. In Browne, which relied
on Johnson and Dubke v. Kassa," the vendee was denied recovery
because the agreement was found to comply with the statute. The
court did not intimate what its decision would have been if the agree-
ment had violated the statute.
If the Washington court wishes to clarify its rule of denying earnest-
money restitution to defaulting purchasers, it could follow one of two
alternatives. It could establish this policy as one of protection to the
vendor which will be administered in the face of legal inconsistency.
Washington would not be alone if such a course were followed." Or, it
could recognize that agreements which fail to comply with the Statute
of Frauds are not void, but incapable of being enforced directly.3 If
the latter course were followed, indirect enforcement would not result
22 2 CoirNm, CONTRACTS § 332 (1950).23 Schweiter v. Halsey, 57 Wn2d 707, 716, 359 P2d 821, 826 (1961).
2
- Id. at 711, 359 P.2d at 823.
25 RrsTATSmNT, CONTRACTS § 355 (4) (1932).
2628 Wash. 515, 68 Pac. 867 (1902).
27 36 Wn2d 321, 217 P.2d 787 (1950).28 Johnson v. Puget Mill Co., 28 Wash. 515, 519, 68 Pac. 867, 868 (1902).2 Dubke v. Kassa, 29 Wn2d 486, 187 P.2d 611 (1947).
30 See authorities cited note 11 supra.
31 See authorities cited note 6 supra.
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in inconsistency. It makes no great difference to the attorney whether
the Washington court chooses to solidify its position in denying restitu-
tion on the Sckweiter facts by declaring such agreements merely un-
enforceable, or continues to treat them as void. The court's decision
will apparently be to deny restitution in keeping with Washington case
law." Non-compliance with the Statute of Frauds will prevent only the
direct enforcement of the contract. Legal relations will continue to
be indirectly enforced, with the unenforceable contract serving as a
valid defense to the defaulting purchaser's action for restitution.
STANLEY H. BARER
CRIMINAL LAW
Murder- Negligent Medical Treatment Intervening Between
Defendant's Act and Decedent's Death. In reviewing a murder con-
viction, the Washington court recently was confronted with the prob-
lem of negligent medical treatment intervening between the defendant's
act and the ensuing death. In affirming, the court apparently took
the extreme position that proximate causation is solely a jury question,
the inquiry on appeal being limited to a cause-in-fact analysis.
In State v. Little', the defendant Little and the decedent, Ross John-
son, were both inmates of the state prison at Walla Walla. In settling
a previous disagreement, Little punched and kicked Johnson about the
head, sending him to the prison hospital in a dazed and semiconscious
condition. In a cursory preliminary examination, his injuries were
diagnosed as a concussion with possible skull fracture and brain
damage. Johnson remained in a bed without side rails or other means
of restraint for five days, during which time he was described as con-
tinually "thrashing around . . . throwing his arms about."2 While at
the prison hospital, he fell out of bed five times, striking his head
against the wall, an iron radiator, and on the terrazzo floor. On the
fifth day, X-rays and a thorough examination counseled his prompt
removal via the prison doctor's station wagon to Western State Hospi-
tal, where he died before an operation could be performed.
The case presented a serious causation problem, for it was impossible
to ascertain the source of the fatal injuries. Both the beating and the
five falls had occurred before any X-rays were made. At the trial,
32 See cases cited note 4 supra.
'57 Wn.2d 516, 358 P2d 120 (1961).2 Id. at 518, 358 P.2d 121.
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